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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
ITY FOR

PERSONAL

-

GOVERNMENT LIABIL-

INJURIES TO MILITARY PERSONNEL

-

The Feres doctrine does not bar recovery by a serviceman
under the FTCA when the claim does not involve or compromise a military relationship and when the suit will not
encroach upon the military disciplinary structure. Johnson
v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir.), vacatedfor reh'g
en banc, 760 F.2d 244 (11 th Cir. 1985), reinstated, No. 835764 (11 th Cir. Jan. 13, 1986) (per curiam).
On January 7, 1982, the Hawaiian offices of the United
States Coast Guard' dispatched a helicopter to search for
a civilian boat in distress. 2 Horton W. Johnson, an activeduty member of the Coast Guard, piloted the helicopter
assigned for the rescue operation. During the course of
the mission, Johnson encountered inclement weather conditions and requested radar assistance 3 from civilian air
controllers employed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).' Shortly after the FAA personnel assumed
control of Johnson's flight path, the helicopter crashed
1 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides that the Coast Guard operates as "a military
service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times."
2 Coastal rescue missions constitute one of the Coast Guard's primary duties
under federal law. See id. at § 2 ("The Coast guard shall ...
maintain and operate
• . . rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas
Federal regulations require a pilot to utilize radar assistance when poor visibility conditions exist. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (1984). Military pilots must
comply with these regulations except in cases of "military emergency or urgent
military necessity, [and] when appropriate military authority so determines, and
prior notice thereof is given to the Secretary of Transportation." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1348(f) (1982).
4 The FAA functions as a civilian administration, under the auspices of the Department of Transportation (DOT). See Act ofJan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449,
1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 2413, 2416 (to be codified at 49
U.S.C. § 106(a)) (revising without substantive change 49 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1982)).
Interestingly, the Coast Guard also operates as a service in DOT except in times
of war. 14 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1982). Therefore, Johnson and the air controllers (the
alleged tortfeasors in this case) were employees of the same department.
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into the side of a mountain on Molokai Island. Johnson
died in the crash.
Johnson's widow, Frieda Joyce Johnson, instituted an
action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).5 Mrs. Johnson's complaint alleged
that the FAA controllers acted negligently by vectoring
Johnson's helicopter into the mountainside. The Government moved to dismiss the complaint, urging that it failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Government contended that since Johnson's death occurred incident to his military service, the Feres doctrine 6
barred recovery under the FTCA. The district court
agreed, and dismissed the action with prejudice. 7
Mrs. Johnson appealed the dismissal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. She argued that the Feres doctrine did not apply to her case,
since no military relationship existed between the decedent and the civilian employees of the FAA. Held, reversed
and remanded: The Feres doctrine does not bar recovery by
a serviceman under the FTCA when the claim does not
involve or compromise a military relationship and when
the suit will not encroach upon the military disciplinary
structure. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th
Cir.), vacated for reh'g en banc, 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir.
1985), reinstated, No. 83-5764 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 1986)
(per curiam).
-528 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1982). For the pertinent language of the FTCA,
see infra note 13 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history and purpose behind the FTCA).
6 The Feres doctrine originated in the landmark case of Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950). Briefly stated, the doctrine holds that the FTCA does not
waive the federal government's sovereign immunity for injuries to military personnel, if the injuries arise out of or are incident to military service. See infra notes
33-55 and accompanying text, for a complete discussion of Feres.
I Technically, the district court erred by dismissing the action for failure to
state a claim. Such a dismissal reflects a disposition on the merits, but a defense
based on Feres rests on the notion that the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
merits of the case. See Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1532 n.2 (1 th
Cir. 1985). In light of the circuit court's holding, however, this error proved "of
no consequence." Id.
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TROUBLED HISTORY

The Feres doctrine finds its roots in common law concepts of sovereign immunity. Briefly stated, "sovereign
immunity" refers to the idea that a litigant cannot assert
an otherwise meritorious claim against a sovereign state
unless the sovereign consents to suit. 8 Originally, this

principle shielded the United States from liability for its
own tortious conduct, as well as for torts committed by its
agents. 9 In 1946, however, the United States Congress
passed the FTCA in an effort to mitigate the harsh consequences10 often produced by sovereign immunity."
The FTCA waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain contexts, making the United States amena8 The doctrine of sovereign immunity grew out of sixteenth-century metaphysical concepts regarding the nature of the feudal state as it existed in England at
that time. The lord of a feudal manor could not be subjected to suit in his own
courts. The King of England, the supreme feudal lord, enjoyed this same protection. Muskopfv. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 212 n.1, 359 P.2d 457, 458
n.l, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 n.1 (1961). For a more extensive discussion of the doctrine, see id. See also Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 30 NACCA L.J.
404, 406-09 (1963).
9 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139. The English version of the sovereign immunity
doctrine rested largely upon the notion that the king enjoyed immunity in his
courts as a matter of personal, royal prerogative. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924). Given the absence of a sovereign in the United
States, adoption of the doctrine in this country remains somewhat of a mystery.
Id. at 4-5.
,0 Exceptions and alternative remedies had been created in England to prevent
the injustice which sometimes occurred through strict application of sovereign
immunity principles. Muskopf, 55 Cal. 2d at 212 n.l, 359 P.2d at 458 n.l, 11 Cal.
Rptr. at 90 n. 1. For example, a claimant always could seek equitable relief through
the Court of Exchequer since the king was thought to be the fountain of equity.
Id. Furthermore, a citizen of the Crown could obtain legal relief through a "petition of right" if he could show a legal right to redress. Id. When the United
States adopted common law sovereign immunity, it failed to devise similar exceptions and alternatives. Blind application of the rule by American courts frequently
resulted in grossly inequitable denials of relief to legitimate claimants. See
Borchard, supra note 9, at 5.
1 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1532 (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 139). Several earlier attempts were made to provide detours for bypassing the sovereign immunity barrier. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40. Before enactment of the FTCA, a private
citizen's only recourse for injuries suffered through government negligence was
to seek a private relief bill from Congress. The FTCA sought to alleviate the burdens this placed both on private claimants and Congress. H.R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946).
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ble to suit in federal court for conduct which would
subject a private individual to tort liability.1 2 Specifically,
the FTCA provides that the United States shall be liable
for "injury or. . . death caused by [the negligence of any
government employee] under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant."' 3 The Supreme Court's initial reactions to the
FTCA were somewhat schizophrenic. 4 In one case the
Court offered a very broad interpretation of the FTCA,
suggesting that the preclusion of tort claims through
more narrow interpretations might frustrate the purpose
of the statute.' 5 In another instance, the Court balked at a
liberal reading of the FTCA, fearful of going beyond the
boundaries of the FTCA and the sovereign immunity the
FTCA waived.' 6 Despite the confusion, one fact remained
clear: the FTCA did not impose blanket liability. 17 On the
contrary, Congress included specific exceptions in the
statute, which retained the government's immunity for
certain types of activities.' 8 Much of the aforementioned
uncertainty sprang out of attempts to define the parameters of these exceptions."
Questions about the role the FTCA should play in the
See supra note 5.
,3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
,4 See Note, From Feres to Stencel. Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery? 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, From Feres
to Stencel].
,- See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (holding that the
Coast Guard's operation of a lighthouse beacon does not constitute a "discretionary function" for which the government remains immune from suit). For the statutory text of the "discretionary function" exception, see infra note 19.
- See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (holding that the government's adoption of a fertilizer export plan amounted to a "discretionary" activity
under the FTCA; hence, the government could not be held liable for injuries
caused by a negligently induced explosion of dangerous fertilizer chemicals).
12

'7 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1532.

-, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) lists the express exceptions to the FTCA. These
exceptions include claims arising out of negligent postal handling, most intentional tort claims, claims arising out of military combat activities, and claims arising in a foreign country. Id.
"I The immunity which the government retained for "discretionary functions,"
for example, presented one of the most troubling exceptions for the courts. See
supra notes 15-16. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) contains this exception, providing
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military context added still more fuel to the fires of confusion. 20 The Supreme Court has long recognized that
cases involving the military present special issues and concerns distinct from those found in a typical civilian lawsuit. 2 ' Accordingly, the Court has declared that Congress
enjoys the liberty of legislating with greater breadth when
prescribing laws directed at the armed services.2 2
The language employed in the FTCA offers little assistance in solving the military problem. 2 The FTCA does
exclude "any claim arising out of the combatant activities
of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war."' 24 Yet the statute does not exclude all ac-

tions by members of the military; specifically; it does not
exclude those actions arising out of non-combatant activities.2 5 Nevertheless, the courts soon "rushed in where
legislators feared to tread."'2 6 This judicial intrepidity

found expression in the Feres doctrine - a court-implied
exception to the FTCA, barring claims arising out of or
incident to military service.2 v
Congressional omission of FTCA language to deal with
claims by military personnel arising out of non-combatant
duties left a legislative gap in the structure of the FTCA.28
that the FTCA does not apply to claims based upon "a discretionary function or
duty on the part of. . . the Government."
20 See infra notes 24 -27 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (refusing to subject the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to the same rigorous constitutional scrutiny applied to
civilian criminal codes, because of unique disciplinary concerns present in military
situations). Parker stated that the "military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society." Id. at 743. This distinction stems from the "primary business of armies and navies to fight . . . wars should the occasion arise."
Id. (quoting United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)). See also
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[C]omplex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training . . . and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments.
22 Parker,417 U.S. at 756.
2
See infra note 24 and accompanying text. See also Note, From Feres to Stencel,
supra note 14.
24

226
27
28

28 U.S.C. § 2680(0) (1982).

Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1532.

Id. (quoting Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980)).
See supra note 6.
See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's first occasion to address this gap
arose in Brooks v. United States. 29 In Brooks, a United States
Army truck, driven by a civilian employee of the Army,
struck a car carrying Welker Brooks and his brother, Arthur.3 0 Arthur Brooks died in the crash, and his brother
Welker suffered severe injuries. 3 Both men served in the
armed forces, but were not on duty when the accident occurred. 2 The Brookses sued the United States under the
FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of the Army truck
driver.3 The Supreme Court upheld the Brookses' FTCA
claims, on the ground that the accident had nothing to do
with their army careers.3 4 According to the Court, Congress would have been more explicit in its legislation if it
intended to bar FTCA claims by servicemen in all situations. 3 5 The Court expressly reserved opinion on how to
handle a case involving injuries incident to service under
the FTCA. 6
Just one year later in Feres v. United States,3 7 the Supreme
Court came face-to-face with the question it had been able
to avoid in Brooks. 3 Feres involved three consolidated
cases.3 9 Claims by servicemen in two of these cases alleged medical malpractice on the part of United States
Army physicians. 40 The third case involved the claim of a
serviceman killed in a barrack destroyed by fire.'" In each
case, the claimant sustained his injury while on active
2i9

337 U.S. 49 (1949).

3o Id. at 50.
s Id.
32

Id.

- Id.
.4

Id. at 52.

Id. at 51.
. Id. at 52 ("Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be presented. We express no opinion as to it .
340 U.S. 135 (1950).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
31,Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
37

'1

40 Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom., Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); and Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518
(4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
41 Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
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duty, at the hands of others in the armed forces.4 2 In deciding whether or not the FTCA imposed government liability in such situations, the Court stated:
There are few guiding materials for our task of statutory
construction. No committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute was designed to have on the
problem before us, or that it even was in mind. Under
these circumstances, no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we misinterpret the Act, at least Congress
possesses a ready remedy.43
In this absence of legislative direction, the Feres Court
proceeded to a cautious interpretation of the FTCA, establishing what has proven to be the only judicially-created exception to the FTCA.44 The Court refused
recovery by the servicemen, holding that "the Government is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to serof or are in the
vicemen where the injuries arise out
' 45
service.
to
incident
activity
of
course
The Feres Court gave several reasons why the FTCA did
' 46
not impose liability for claims "incident to service.
First, it noted that the FTCA imposes governmental liability only to "the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances. ' 47 Because no law had ever permitted
an American soldier to sue the federal government for
negligence, and because private citizens have no authority
to raise an army, the Court found an absence of the requisite "parallel private liability."'48 Second, the Court
pointed out that the FTCA relies on the substantive law of
the state where the accident occurred for determining the
extent of the government's liability. 49 Since servicemen
42

Id. at 138.

4. Id.

Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1102.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
46 See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
47 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)).
4s Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
41. Id. at 142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) ("the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred" governs liability under the FTCA).
44

4
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have little or no choice of habitat, application of the
FTCA to their claims would result in an unfair, non-uni-

form claims system. 50 Additionally, the Court suggested
that application of state law to claims brought by soldiers
would be an encroachment on the "distinctively federal"
character of the relationship between the government and

its armed forces. 5 ' Finally, the Court reasoned that Congress already provided a sufficient compensation scheme
in the form of veterans' benefits.52
Feres and its progeny reflected the judicial conviction

that some rule must exist to block certain FTCA claims by
military personnel, even in some non-combat situations.53
Accepting arguendo the premise that such a rule should exist, 54 two closely-related questions remained unanswered:
(1) When the rule should be applied, and (2) Why the rule

should be applied. The conflicting decisions rendered
since the inception of the Feres doctrine, as well as the
widespread criticism the doctrine has received,55 suggest
that the courts have yet to produce a satisfactory response
to either question.5 6
A.

When Feres Should Be Applied Service" Problem

"The Incident to

In attempts to answer the "when" question, the most
plaguing difficulty faced by the courts has been classifica-

tion vel non of an activity as "incident to service."'5 7 In
Brooks, 58 the pre-Feres decision discussed

above,

the

Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
m Id.. at 143-44.
-' Id. at 144.
. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
M Some commentators have suggested that the need for such a rule does not
exist. See, e.g., Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1125-26.
-- See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp.
1242, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing a laundry list of sources criticizing the Feres
rule, and refusing to apply it to bar FTCA claims by military wives and children
injured indirectly by former servicemen's contact with agent orange).
. See infra notes 57 &74 and accompanying text.
.7 See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1099-1100 nn.6-7.
.- 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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Supreme Court allowed FTCA recovery by servicemen injured during a furlough period when a military vehicle
struck their private car. The Brooks Court concluded that
the plaintiffs were not acting incident to service, stating
that the accident "had nothing to do with [the plaintiffs']
army career[s]. '
Since Feres, some courts have adopted a Brooks-like approach, barring claims only if the serviceman suffered the
injury while on active duty.60 Other courts have based the
"incident to service" determination on whether the claimant sustained the injuries on-base or off-base. 61 These
considerations, however, have provided little assistance in
the vast majority of cases.6 2 Most courts have placed a
primary emphasis on the type of activity which gave rise to
between the activity
the injury, looking for relevant links
63
and the claimant's military duties.
The range of activities considered incident to service
59Id. at 52.

See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (barring an
FTCA claim by a marine injured while riding a horse rented from a military-operated stable, since his active-duty status made the injury "incident to service");
Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.) (denying FTCA recovery by a
Navy enlisted man for injuries sustained by the negligence of Navy physicians,
since the injury occurred while the claimant was on active duty), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 819 (1973).
6,See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966) (pointing
out the on-base situs of the accident in denying FTCA recovery to the parents of
an Air Force enlisted man who died at a swimming pool on the base); Zoula v.
United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954) (precluding FTCA claims by servicemen injured in a collision with an Army ambulance, since the accident occurred
on a military reservation).
62 Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing FTCA
recovery to the family of a soldier killed in an off-duty car crash with a vehicle
driven by another serviceman, and stating, "The Supreme Court cases under
[Feres] do not provide many clear signposts to the parameters of 'incident to
service.' ").
63 See, e.g.,
Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969) (vacating and
remanding the dismissed case of a serviceman suing under the FTCA when he was
struck by a car after being haled to the middle of a highway where a military police
vehicle was stopped); Schwager v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (denying the Government's motion for summary judgment in an FTCA case
instituted by the widow of a sailor who died because of the alleged negligence of
naval hospital agents).
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may be fairly broad.64 For example, the courts have
barred FTCA claims for injuries sustained while riding a
horse rented from a military-operated stable,6 5 playing
"donkey softball,' 66 swimming in an on-base swimming
pool, 6 and riding a bus to a beach party sponsored by the
military. 68 And, of course, Feres itself found claimants' injuries incident to service when they resulted from the alleged medical malpractice of Army physicians.6 9
B.

Why Feres Should Be Applied Their Demise

The Rationales and

Much of the difficulty in determining when to apply
Feres occurs because of uncertainty about "why" the rule
should be applied. Several different rationales have been
offered to support the Feres doctrine. 70 These include the
absence of a "parallel private liability" 7 1; the notion that
since state tort law must be consulted under the FTCA,72
recovery by servicemen would be irrationally dependent
upon geographic considerations beyond the victim's
sphere of control7 3 ; the possible adverse effects FTCA
claims might have on military discipline 74 ; the existence of
4 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
'H

Hass, 518 F.2d at 1141-42.

Keisel v. Buckeye Donkey Ball, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Va. 1970) (finding that the military-sponsored ball game, despite its recreational nature, constituted an activity "incident to service").
67 Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966).
-" Degentesh v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. I11.
1964) (concluding
that despite the pleasurable nature of the beach party in question, it still constituted an activity "incident to service" due to the military sponsorship involved).
- See Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
10 See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 101; Johnson, 749 F.2d at
1532-33; Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-46.
71 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
12 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
7- Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43.
7'
While the Feres Court may have based its decision partly on the military discipline concern, it did not articulate this reasoning. Four years after Fetes, however,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the discipline factor as one of the foundation stones of the Fetes doctrine. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112
(1954). In an opinion refusing to bar a veteran's claim for medical malpractice by
an Army surgeon, the Brown Court made the following statement:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
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an alternative compensation scheme for service personnel 75 ; and the "distinctively federal" relationship in military cases.76 Over the rocky road of Feres' thirty-five year
history, these rationales have been knocked down and
reasserted, analyzed and reanalyzed.7 7
1. ParallelPrivate Liability
The "parallel private liability" rationale became the
first theoretical predicate of Feres to fall prey to criticism.78
Feres had suggested that the express language of the
FTCA barred military claims since they lacked a parallel,
or an analogy, in the private sector.7 9 The Court reasoned that to interpret the FTCA otherwise would "visit
the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities, ' 8° a visitation which the Court believed Congress
did not intend.8" Despite the force of this argument in
Feres, the Supreme Court later rejected the parallel liability test completely. 2 In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,8"
the Court held the United States liable on an FTCA claim
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed
in the course of military duty, led the [Feres] Court to read that Act as
excluding claims of that character.
Id. at 112.
75 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
76 Id. at 143-44.
17 See infra notes 78-130 and accompanying text.
See also Johnson, 749 F.2d at

1533-35.

78Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1533.
79 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42. The "parallel private liability" theory relies specifically on that portion of the FTCA which provides that the government will be
liable "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Stated simply, the theory argues that the
foregoing provision impliedly retains sovereign immunity where the case involves
tortious activity unique to the government, such that no parallel private liability
exists in state law. Logically, most military-related injuries would fit into this category since no private individual enjoys the power to raise an army. See Note, Fron
Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1103.
-0 Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
81 Id.

See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
- 350 U.S. 61 (1955).

M2
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for loss of a barge by a towing company resulting from
negligent operation of a Coast Guard lighthouse. 84 The
Court concluded that it "would be attributing bizarre motives to Congress [to predicate FTCA liability on] the
'85
presence or absence of identical private activity."
Shortly after Indian Towing, the Supreme Court delivered
the final coup de grace to the parallel liability test in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.86 In allowing FTCA recovery
for property destroyed by fire through the negligence of
the United States Forest Service, the Rayonier Court expressly rejected the parallel liability test as a misinterpretation of the FTCA. 87 As a result of these decisions,
application of the Feres doctrine today requires more than
'
the absence of "parallel private liability. "88

2.

The Uniformity Argument
A second Feres rationale which quickly succumbed was

the idea that the FTCA "law of the place ' 89 requirement
creates an unfair non-uniformity when applied to servicemen who have no choice of habitat. 90 The Feres Court reasoned that the resort to state tort law required by the
FTCA:
perhaps is fair enough when the claimant is not on duty or
is free to choose his own habitat and thereby limit the jurisdiction in which it will be possible for federal activities
to cause him injury. But a soldier on active duty has no
such choice. . . . That the geography of an injury should
select the
law to be applied to his tort claims makes no
9 1
sense.

Id. at 68-70.
H.,Id. at 67.
m 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
s1 Id. at 319. The Court concluded that "the very purpose of the [FTCA] was to
waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions
and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability." Id.
"" See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1533; Note, Froni Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at
1104.
81'See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
,Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1534.
," Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43.
84
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But the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in
United States v. Muniz,9 2 allowing a federal prisoner to pursue an FTCA claim despite the prisoner's lack of control
over his environment. 3 The Muniz Court pointed out
that complete denial of any tort recovery presents far
greater prejudice to the claimant than application of nonuniform state laws. 94 Thus, the uniformity argument
seems to have fallen to the wayside along with the parallel
liability test. 95
3.

The Discipline Factor

Although the remaining rationales have fared much
better, 96 these pillars of support have not escaped criticism. 97 Several courts have suggested that the military
discipline rationale constitutes the most important and
defensible reason for application of the Feres doctrine. 98
The discipline rationale rests on a fear that FTCA claims
by servicemen might place a chilling effect on the exercise
of military expertise and discretion in carrying out military operations. 99 The hindering effect FTCA liability
might have on an officer's willingness to issue commands
might strain the military's need for discipline, both on the
battlefield and in training.100 Furthermore, such claims
might prompt a subordinate to disobey or challenge an
order issued by his superior.' 0 ' Although at least one
92

374 U.S. 150 (1963).

q- Id. at 164-65.
04 Id. at 162. Although Muniz dealt with a federal prisoner and not with a serviceman, the case can be seen as further erosion of the uniformity rationale in the
military context as well. See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1533. Soldiers and prisoners are
in similar circumstances with respect to their choice of forum in a lawsuit, since
the government chooses the habitat for both.
o.1For a more extensive discussion of the uniformity problem, see Note, From

Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1118-21.

- See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
97 See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1104-18.

- See, e.g., Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1533 (citing Brown, 348 U.S. at 112, for the
proposition that the discipline factor best explains the Feres rule).
- See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1118.

lo Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1984).
lo, See Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
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scholar has advocated rejection of the discipline factor as
a rationale for the Feres
rule,' 0 2 it continues to enjoy the
0 3
favor of most courts.'
4.

Existence of Alternative Compensation

A subject of greater criticism has been the "existence of
alternative compensation" rationale.10 4 The Feres Court
breathed life into this rationale by concluding that Congress did not intend the FTCA to apply to the military,
since legislation had already been enacted providing for
disability payments to injured servicemen.10 5 The FTCA's
legislative history revealed no congressional utterances
on this issue. 10 6 The Court, however, found this silence
indicative of congressional intent to make the existing veterans' compensation scheme an exclusive remedy.10 7
One of the criticisms leveled at alternative compensation focuses on the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of the rationale. 0 8 The Court has also been
condemned for assuming that disability payments offer a
102 Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1104-09, and the sources cited
therein.
103 See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 598-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (allowing Swine Flu Act recovery by servicemen who contracted disease after receiving swine flu shots, and noting that "the protection of military discipline . . .
serves largely if not exclusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine");Johnson,
749 F.2d at 1539 (allowing prosecution of plaintiffs claim since it "cannot conceivably involve or compromise . . . the military disciplinary structure").
See, e.g., Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1104-09.
105 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
When the Court handed down the Feres decision,
disability payments to veterans were awarded pursuant to various laws included in
Title 38 of the United States Code. These laws have since been completely revised
by the Veterans' Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958).
o, Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
107 Id. at 140. The Feres Court concluded that Congress passed the FTCA to
extend compensation to the remediless, not to those who already enjoyed a comprehensive system of relief. Id. See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at
1105-06, for a further discussion of why the Court reached this conclusion.
100 See, e.g., Parker, 611 F.2d at 1011-12; Brief of Appellant at 12, Johnson v.
United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellant]. As an example of this inconsistent treatment, compare Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (veterans' benefits should be set off against but
should not bar FTCA recovery), with Feres, 340 U.S. at 144 (veterans' benefits
preclude FTCA recovery).
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"simple, certain and uniform"' ' alternative to FTCA recovery. 110 Unlike most other compensation schemes,
which create a vested right in the beneficiary, veterans'
awards are conditional in nature."' Temporary or permanent forfeiture of the award can occur for a number of
reasons, including imprisonment, treason, subversivet2activities, conscientious objection, and homosexuality."
Because of the attacks upon the alternative compensation rationale, some courts have come close to rejecting
the rationale as a valid justification for the Feres doctrine. 3 While one of the Supreme Court's most recent
opinions reaffirmed the alternative compensation ration-5
ale, 14 the Court has questioned its viability in the past."
This questioning exemplifies the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of the alternative compensation rationale." 6 In some cases, the Court has nearly ignored the
rationale, while in other decisions the Court lists the1 7rationale as a major foundation for the Feres doctrine.
Distinctively Federal Character

5.

The vitality of the somewhat nebulous "distinctively
federal character" rationale has also been questioned."'
Closely related to both the discipline and uniformity concerns, this leg of the Feres doctrine stands on the unique
- Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
no See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1106-08 (suggesting that vet-

erans' benefits are not as certain as some have assumed).
Id. at 1107-08.
See id. at nn.51-57 and accompanying text.
113See, e.g., Hunt, 636 F.2d at 595.
ill

112

114 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983).
For a complete discussion of
the Chappell case, see infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
, See Brown, 348 U.S. at 113 (noting that in Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to make veterans' benefits an exclusive
remedy).

I1i' See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
1,7Compare Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-73
(1977) (listing the alternative compensation provided by veterans' benefits as one
of three rationales for invoking the Feres doctrine), with Brown, 348 U.S. at 112
(refusing to apply Feres although the plaintiff was eligible for veterans' benefits,
since the case did not involve a threat to military discipline).
I - See Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1110-12.
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relationship which exists between the United States and
its service personnel." 9 Courts have usually given deference to military autonomy and the unique role of the
American military. 20 The constitutional duopoly enjoyed
by the executive and legislative branches with respect to
the military, 121 the need to safeguard the military disciplinary structure for national security, 12 2 and other militarya part in prompting the judicial
unique concerns 123 played
24
restraint found in Feres.'
Despite the judiciary's reluctance to involve itself with
military cases, the "distinctively federal" argument has
been criticized. 2 5 To begin with, the Supreme Court has
become increasingly willing to review court-martial and
military administrative decisions. 126 One author has asserted that military autonomy issues in tort cases would
be identical to military autonomy questions in court-martial and administrative review cases. 127 Hence, the federal
relationship issue should not bar judicial review of FTCA
claims made by soldiers. 128 Secondly, the "distinctively
federal" argument could be made just as forcefully with
1-' Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
A
120 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Barker, Military Law Separate System ofJurisprudence, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 223, 226-37 (1967).
121 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives Congress the power to raise and support armies,
to maintain a navy, to make rules for the government of the armed forces, and to
organize, train and equip a militia. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl.1 makes the President the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
122 See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 540-41 (1974). Sherman asserts that courts frequently back
away from judicial review of military cases because the "very survival of the nation" rests in the hands of the military. Id. at 540.
-I See generally Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1109-12 (noting that
frequently allowing FTCA claims by injured servicemen raises fears that soldiers
will begin to "second-guess" orders, or that discipline could be affected by the
testimony of one soldier against another).
4 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-46.
12-1
Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1109-12.
1261Id. at 1114-17. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956) (sharply curtailing
Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction over civilians); Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579 (1958) (broadening the path to civilian court review of military administration decisions).
127 Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 14, at 1114-17.
128 Id. at 1118.
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respect to other federal agencies that do not enjoy immunity from FTCA claims.1 29 Despite these criticisms, the
Supreme Court continues to cling to the "distinctively
30
federal" rationale. 1
C. A Revival of the Feres Rationales?
1. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States
By the mid-1970's, disgruntlement with the Feres doctrine prompted expectations that the Supreme Court
might discard the rule.' 3 t At the very least, one might

have expected the Court to deliver a death blow to the
widely-discredited "distinctively federal" and "alternative
compensation"

rationales. 13 2

The

expected

mortal

33

wounds never came.
Instead, the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the Feres doctrine with the 1977
case of Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.' 34 In
'" Jaffe v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). In a case barring tort recovery to a former soldier
injured in radiation tests of a nuclear device, theJaffe court noted that the "distinctively federal" argument probably serves only to reinforce the other Feres rationales. Id. at 1233. A major weakness of the "distinctively federal" rationale is
that similar arguments could be made regarding the "'Bureau of the Census, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and many other agencies of the Federal
Government'" not immune from FTCA liability. Id. at 1233 (quoting Stencel, 431
U.S. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
3,, See, e.g., Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672, stating that "the ['distinctively federal character' rationale] considered in Feres operates with equal force in this case." Id.
131 See, e.g., Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting an FTCA claim filed by the parents of a serviceman whose death was allegedly attributable to naval hospital negligence, the court concluded that it had no
choice but to follow Feres, despite the doctrine's anomalies); Peluso v. United
States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973) (reluctantly
rejecting the FTCA claim brought by the parents of a national guardsman killed
by the alleged negligence of an Army hospital, and stating, "[Ihf the matter were
open to us we would be receptive to the appellants' argument that Feres should be
reconsidered."); Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS
L. REV. 316 (1954); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 AF.L.
REV. 24 (1976).

1.2 See generally Brief of Appellant, supra note
108, at 11-17. The Appellant
quoted Hunt, 636 F.2d at 599: "ITihe protection of military discipline.., serves
largely if not exclusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine." Brief of Appellant,
supra note 108, at 13 (emphasis added).
".-

See infra note 134 and accompanying text.

1-14

431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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Stencel, a National Guard officer received permanent injuries when his fighter aircraft's ejection system malfunctioned during a mid-air crisis.' 35 The disabled pilot filed
suit against both the Government and Stencel, the manufacturer of the ejection system. 1 6 Stencel brought a
cross-claim against the United States, seeking indemnity
for its own liability to the pilot. '317 The lower courts barred
both the pilot's and Stencel's claims against the Government, and Stencel appealed.'3 8 The Supreme Court, applying the Feres doctrine, affirmed the denial of FTCA
recovery by the manufacturer. 39 The Court not only reaffirmed the Feres doctrine, but "dusted off and reasserted"' 40 the "distinctively federal" and "alternative
compensation" rationales.' 4'

These rationales, in addi-

tion to the "military discipline" consideration, were recognized 2in Stencel as the analytical triad upon which Feres
4
rested.1
2.

Chappell v. Wallace

The Stencel Court's cursory treatment of the Feres doctrine's rationales 4 3 has prompted suggestions that the decision amounts to a judicial aberration, which should be
overturned.' 44 However, in Chappell v. Wallace,' 45 the
,3 Id. at 667.
136Id. at 668.
137

Id.

138 Id.

,39Id. at 673-74. For an extensive discussion of how the Feres rule affects U.S.
defense contractors, see Note, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States: An Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Military Contractors, Subcontractors, and Suppliers,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 1217 (1978).
140 Parker, 611 F.2d at 1011.
141 Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671-73.
142

Id.

,41ChiefJustice Burger's majority opinion accepted the Feres rationales without
any apparent analysis of their merit. Id.at 669-74. Despite an exhaustive dissent,
id. at 674-77, the majority failed to acknowledge any of the criticisms directed at
the doctrine during its twenty-five year history.
144 See In re "Agent Orange," 580 F. Supp. at 1246-47 (citing several post-Stencel
cases which apply Feres "reluctantly" and question the continuing viability of its
theoretical bases). See also Brief of Appellant, supra note 108, at 17-19.
14

462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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Supreme Court recently gave implicit approval to the reasoning in Stencel.' 4 6 In Chappell, five Navy enlisted men
sued their superior officers for alleged unconstitutional
discrimination. 47 The plaintiffs urged that because of
their minority race, the defendant officers failed to assign
them desirable duties and gave them low performance
evaluations. 48 The Court noted that the remedy sought
depended on the absence of "special factors counselling
hesitation."' 49 The Court identified these "special factors" as the same alternative compensation, distinctivelyfederal,
and military discipline factors enunciated in Stencel as the
backbone of the Feres doctrine. 50 Finding these factors
were present, the Chappell Court denied recovery by the
enlisted men.' 5 ' For the moment at least, 152 the Chappell
reasoning indicates that Stencel's reaffirmation of Feres and
its theoretical underpinnings "is beyond question. . . the
146

See id. at 299.

Id. at 297. While federal officials generally are immune from such suits, the
Supreme Court has authorized recovery against federal agents whose actions
amount to a serious violation of an individual's constitutional rights. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(holding agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics liable for the warrantless entry
of the petitioner's apartment, since it clearly violated his fourth amendment right
to privacy).
141 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297.
149 Id. at 298 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
150 Id. at 298-99.
1
Id. at 305.
152 The Supreme Court's most recent admonition on the application of Feres
appears in United States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1985). In Shearer, the Court
concluded that Feres barred FTCA recovery by a mother whose Army private son
was murdered by a fellow soldier while off duty and away from the base. Id. at
3041. The Court saw the plaintiffs allegation that the Army negligently failed to
exercise control over the murderer as a claim which "goes directly to the 'management' of the military [calling] into question basic choices about . . . discipline."
Id. at 3043. Although it cited Stencel with approval, the Court skirted the "distinctively federal" and "alternative compensation" rationales endorsed by Stencel.
The Shearer majority did assert, however, that "[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute
as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases." Id. The Supreme Court
handed down the Shearer opinion shortly after the panel decision in Johnson. The
per curiam opinion from the en banc rehearing in Johnson relied on the Shearer
language quoted above to support its reinstatement of the panel decision. See
infra note 211 and accompanying text.
147
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THE STATUS OF THE TORTFEASOR: PAVING THE WAY
FOR INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICT

In Uptegrove v. United States, 154 the Ninth Circuit denied
FTCA recovery on facts "strikingly similar"' 5 5 to those in

Johnson.1 56 The Uptegrove court barred an FTCA suit by
the widow of a Navy Lieutenant killed in the crash of an
Air Force C-141 transport, allegedly caused by the negligence of three civilian FAA air traffic controllers. 57 The
Uptegrove court did not consider the tortfeasors' civilian
status important, stating that "the status of the deceased
or injured person controls."' 158 The Uptegrove decision fol59
lowed an earlier Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Lee,'
which employed similar reasoning in denying FTCA recovery to two active-duty marines killed in an airplane
crash that allegedly resulted from FAA controller negli-

gence. 6° A decision from the Seventh Circuit, Layne v.
United States,' 6 ' also refused to consider the status of the
tortfeasor in applying Feres. 162 The Layne court refused to
allow an FTCA proceeding by the widow of an Air National Guardsman killed in a training flight accident,
although the alleged tortfeasors were civilian employees
163
of the FAA.
Cases from three other federal circuits have also disregarded the status of the tortfeasor in analyzing FTCA
claims by service personnel, although these cases differ
15.
154

Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1535.
600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).

,15 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539.

15r, Uptegrove, 600 F.2d at 1251.
157 Id.
1-1 Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969)).
151. 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), ceri. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969).
1-" Id. at 562.
',' 295 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962).
,62 Id. at 436.
164 Id.

1986]

CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES

1107

factually from Uptegrove, Lee and Layne.' 64 In Potts v. United
States, 1 65 a Sixth Circuit case, a medical corpsman received
injuries while aboard a Navy landing craft when a cable
used to hoist the craft onto a Navy ship snapped and
struck him. ' 66 The crewmen responsible for operating the
hoist were civilians.' 67 The injured corpsman sued the
United States. t 68 The Sixth Circuit, applying the Feres
doctrine, denied recovery without even
mentioning the ci69
operators.1
hoist
the
of
status
vilian
The Tenth Circuit in Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 170 relied
on a Stencel-type application of Feres to preclude a thirdparty claim against the United States by the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming.17 ' The City sought indemnity after being named a defendant in an action brought by the family
of an Air Force Thunderbird pilot killed in a runway crash
at the municipal airport in Cheyenne. 72 The court cited
Uptegrove and agreed that "the status of the deceased or
injured person . . .controls in determining whether the
' 73
claimant may recover under the Tort Claims Act."'
Hence, the court concluded that the Air Force pilot could
not have sued the United States successfully and, under
Stencel, it necessarily 74followed that the City should not be
allowed to recover. 1
In Hass v. United States,' 75 a United States Marine received injuries while riding a horse rented from a stable
64
165

See infra notes 165-179 and accompaning text.
723 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2172 (1984).

66 Id.

Id.
Id. The plaintiff actually sued under the Public Service Vessels Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1982), and the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52
(1982), rather than the FTCA. The court concluded, however, that Feres applied
with equal force to suits by military personnel under these acts. Potts, 723 F.2d at
22.
167

6

1-6Potts, 723 F.2d at 22.

649 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 831.
172 Id. at 827.
1. Id. at 830.
174 Id. at 830-31.
'7'518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975).
170

171
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owned and operated by the government.' 76 The stable
77
managers were civilian employees of the government.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the Feres doctrine barred the injured marine's
FTCA claim against the government.1 78 As to the civilian
status of the alleged tortfeasors, the court stated:
Although relevant to the ultimate fact inference to be
drawn, it is not, we think, essential to application of the
Feres doctrine that the injury to the serviceman have been
caused by another member of the military rather than a
civilian employee of the military. [In this case the stable
managers'] civilian status did not affect their job performoperance . . . we hold that their civilian status does not
79
doctrine.'
Feres
the
of
application
prevent
to
ate
III.

JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES -

THE COURT'S

ANALYSIS

The Johnson court confronted the issue of whether the
Feres doctrine bars an FTCA suit for the death of an active-duty serviceman, allegedly caused by the negligent
conduct of civilian employees of the FAA.' 80 After wading
through the doctrine's murky history,' 8' the court addressed the arguments raised by both parties.
The court discussed the erosion of the "distinctively
federal" and "alternative compensation" rationales in
Brown and Muniz,' 8 2 but refused to accept the plaintiff's
contention that the "military discipline" concern provides
the only solid ground for an application of Feres.'83 The
plaintiff argued that while Chappell discussed all three of
the Feres rationales reaffirmed in Stencel, the reasoning in
176

1139.

'77

1141.

Id. at
Id. at
178 Id. at
179 Id. at

1142.
1141.

,so Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1531.
- Id. at 1532-35.
,82 Id. at 1533-34.

,83Id. at 1534-35. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 108, at 20, for a more thorough treatment of the plaintiff's argument on this issue.
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Chappell emphasizes the "military discipline" rationale and
"implicitly disavows the first two makeweights historically
mustered in support of the Feres doctrine." 184 The court
rejected this assertion, noting that Chappell did not confine
itself to the "military discipline" factor, but also considered the "alternative compensation" and "distinctively
federal character" rationales.' 85 The court also rejected
an argument that their earlier decision in Parker v. United
States, 18 6 although denying FTCA recovery, had discarded
the widely-criticized rationales. 187
Finally, the Johnson court considered the plaintiff's proposition as requiring an analysis of the discipline factor on
a case-by-case basis.' 88 The court stated that this approach would prove impractical, since "the Armed Services would be faced with maintaining a claims
department."' 8 9 The court acknowledged the willingness
of some jurisdictions to adopt this approach,' 9 0 but concluded that a case-by-case inquiry serves efficiency only
when a case presents a factual situation "radically different from the typical Feres doctrine case."'' If such a situation exists, the rationales of the doctrine must be
184 Reply Brief of Appellant at 6,Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th
Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief of Appellant]. The plaintiff based this
argument on Chappell's recognition that " '[in the last analysis, Feres seems best
explained by the . . . effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline.'"
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301 (quoting Muniz, 374 U.S. at 162).

749 F.2d at 1535 n.4.
-86611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).

185Johnson,

18,7The plaintiff suggested that Parker had rejected the "distinctively federal"
and "alternative compensation" rationales. The author of the Johnson opinion,
Judge Fay, also wrote the Parker opinion. While Parker is a Fifth Circuit decision, it
acts as binding precedent on Eleventh Circuit cases (such asJohnson), thanks to a
recent reorganization of the federal circuit court system. See Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)). While acknowledging Parker's force, the
Johnson court rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Parker had departed from the
original Feres doctrine. See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537 n.7.

-8 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1536 n.6.

(quoting Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353, 354 (Ist Cir. 1971)).
"90See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
application of Feres although both claimant and tortfeasor were active-duty servicemen, since the claims involved could not possibly affect military discipline).
189Id.

-,. Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537 n.6.
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However, when

the standard Feres paradigm presents itself - i.e., when
both the victim and tortfeasor are employees of the armed
services - the sole question is whether
or not the injuries
93
were incurred incident to service.

In Johnson, the court concluded that the events surrounding the decedent's crash made the case factually dis95
similar to Feres. 194 The court agreed with the plaintiff'
that the civilian status of the FAA ground controllers re19 6
quired more than a blind application of the Feres rule.
This finding precluded the Government's argument that
"[t]he status of the deceased, not the status of the
97
tortfeasor, controls."

Finding the facts in Johnson distinguishable from the
Feres paradigm, the court proceeded to analyze the case in
light of the policies supporting the Feres doctrine. 98
Although the court refused to accept the plaintiffs contention that the first two rationales for the doctrine were
no longer viable,' 99 the court recognized that the discipline factor "serves largely if not exclusively as the predi° Applying the Feres policies
cate for the Feres doctrine. 200
to the Johnson facts, the court concluded that not only
could the conduct of the civilian tortfeasors be scrutinized
without implicating the military services, but the case
presented no danger of compromising military discipline. 20 ' The court then decided that the plaintiffs FTCA
I'l Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537.

Id.

I3

,94 Id. at 1537-39.

,0.1Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 184, at 3.
, Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539.

,07 Brief for the United States at 9, Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530
(Ilth Cir. 1985).
-m Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1535-39.
199 See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.

Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Hunt, 636 F.2d at 599).
Id. In an initial Petition for Rehearing (which the court denied, id. at 1530),
the Government accused the court of focusing solely on the discipline factor, at
the expense of the other rationales the opinion expressly acknowledged. See Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 8,Johnson v. United
States, 749 F.2d 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Rehear2W

201
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claim should be allowed to proceed. 0 2
The court criticized the conflicting opinion of the Ninth
Circuit in the Uptegrove case decided on facts similar to
those in Johnson.2 °3 According to Johnson, the Uptegrove
court had applied the Feres doctrine blindly by ignoring
the civilian status of the tortfeasor. 20

4

The court con-

cluded that the Ninth Circuit approach "has the virtue of
easy application, [but is not] the better jurisprudential
course." 20 5 Furthermore, recent developments in the
Feres area raised doubts about the continuing force of the
Uptegrove approach, even within the Ninth Circuit.20 6
ing]. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals later granted a second request by the
Government for an en banc rehearing in the Johnson case. 760 F.2d 244 (11 th Cir.
1985). This action temporarily vacated the original panel opinion analyzed in this
casenote. Following en banc review, a majority of the full court decided to reinstate the panel opinion. Johnson v. United States, No. 83-5764 (11 th Cir.Jan. 13,
1986) (per curiam). For a complete discussion of the per curiam and dissenting
opinions following the en banc rehearing, see infra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
202 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539.
203Id. at 1539-40.
2
Id. at 1540.
205 Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 1984)).
206 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1540 n.12. See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d
1431 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing the FTCA claim of an active-duty serviceman injured by another active-duty serviceman in an after-hours car wreck, since the suit
would not affect military discipline); Brown v. United States, 715 F.2d 463 (9th
Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply Feres in an FTCA suit by active-duty servicemen for
injuries sustained from mandatory swine flu innoculations, and rejecting the Government's contention that application of the Feres doctrine depends strictly upon
the plaintiffis status). The plaintiff argued that both of these recent Ninth Circuit
cases undermined that circuit's earlier postion. See Brief of Appellant, supra note
108, at 13-15.
It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit may soon foreclose further speculation
on its continued adherence to the Uptegrove approach. Lieutenant Johnson's fellow crew member, Mr. Gilardy, also died in the helicopter crash on Molokai Island. Mr. Gilardy's estate has appealed a Feres-based denial of FTCA recovery,
and that appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit. See Gilardy v. United States,
No. 84-2269 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 12, 1984). Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision to rehearJohnson en banc, see supra note 201, the Ninth Circuit issued an order
deferring resolution of the Gilardy appeal " 'pending the filing of the Eleventh
Circuit's en banc decision in Johnson.' " Supplemental Brief of Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 5 n.2, Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir.
1985) (quoting the unpublished order from the Ninth Circuit). On February 10,
1986, less than thirty days after the Eleventh Circuit handed down the en banc
opinion in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit notified the parties in Gilardy that the court
was ready to resume deliberation on the Gilardy appeal. Telephone conversation

1112

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[51

Subsequent to filing of the panel opinion in Johnson, the
Government sought review by the full court of the Eleventh Circuit.2 0 7 The court denied the Government's orig-

inal motion for rehearing en banc, but granted a second,
similar request. 20 8 This action temporarily vacated the

panel opinion. 20 9 Following rehearing, however, a majority of the court issued a per curiam opinion reinstating the
panel opinion. 21 0 The court stated:
[W]e find that the panel opinion has given proper consideration to the Feres factors with particular attention to
whether or not the claims asserted here will implicate civilian courts in conflicts involving the military structure or
military decisions. The claims presented here are based
solely upon the conduct of civilian employees of the
[FAA]. The fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot
for the United States Coast Guard is not sufficient, standing alone, to activate the Feres preclusion. 2 1 '
Three judges joined in dissent from the decision to reinwith Don Salem, counsel for Mr. Gilardy's estate (Feb. 24, 1986). Since the panel
opinion inJohnson now has been upheld by a majority of the full court, the Ninth
Circuit presumably will have to determine whether it will follow the Johnson lead
or reaffirm its Uptegrove position on the tortfeasor status issue.
207 See supra note 201.
208Johnson v. United States, 760 F.2d 244 (1ith Cir. 1985). Seesupra note 201.
209 See supra note 201.
210 Johnson
v. United States, No. 83-5764 (11 th Cir. Jan. 13, 1986) (per
curiam).
21
Id. The court found support for the Johnson approach in Shearer v. United
States, 105 S.Ct. 3039 (1985). The Supreme Court handed down the Shearer decision after the panel opinion had been filed in Johnson. Although Shearer differed
factually from Johnson, en banc review inJohnson led to a conclusion that the panel
opinion comports with the Shearer suggestion that " '[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be
reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the
statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases.' " Johnson v.
United States, No. 83-5764 (1Ith Cir.Jan. 13, 1986) (per curiam) (quoting Shearer,
105 S. Ct. at 3043). The dissent in theJohnson rehearing argued that the majority
of the full court had misinterpreted the Shearer language as a mandate for case-bycase application of the Feres rationales. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent
read the quoted passage as simply a reaffirmance that "each case should be examined in light of the traditional application of the exception - not that each case
should be scrutinized under each Feres rationale." Id. For additional discussion
of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
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state the panel opinion.2 12 The dissent argued that the
majority reinstatement reflects "a novel way to evade the
commands [of binding precedent] to allow recovery. "121
The dissent insisted on a traditional "incident to service"
inquiry, stating that "cases in which a serviceman was injured incident to service by a civilian government employee are hardly novel. This fact pattern has appeared
consistently over the years. And just as consistently, no
court until now has allowed recovery against the government in this sort of suit. ' 21 4 The true "Feres factual paradigm," according to the dissent, includes all situations
involving injuries incident to military service, regardless
of the government tortfeasor's civilian or military
15
2

status.

IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOHNSON

Those who have ventured into the Feres jungle are all
too familiar with the quicksands awaiting one who would
explore the implications of a case likeJohnson.2 16 Despite
the anomalies of the Feres doctrine, some cautious observations can be made about the effects of the Johnson holding. First,Johnsonadmittedly stands in direct conflict with
the decisions of another federal circuit.21 7 A closer examination of the circuits suggests that at least two, and perhaps as many as five circuits, have reached a result
opposite from that reached in Johnson.2 '8 Resolution of
this conflict may require guidance from the United States
212 Johnson v. United States, No. 83-5764 (1 ith Cir.Jan. 13, 1986) (Johnson,J,
dissenting).
213 Id.
214 Id. The dissent cited a number of cases to support this statement, including

the Uptegrove, Lee, Layne, Pots, Carter, and Hass decisions discussed supra notes 154-

178 and accompanying text.
215 Id.
2101 See Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980) (admitting
that Feres sometimes creates anomalies).
See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539.
See supra notes 158-178 and accompanying text. Johnson did not address
these other decisions.
217
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1114 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[51

Supreme Court.2t 9
Next, the Johnson decision does little to remove the confusion surrounding the Feres doctrine, its rationales, and
its applicability. For example, the case does not offer guidance as to whether the doctrine can be invoked without a
nexus between the claim and military discipline. Similarly,Johnson provides no certain directive on what course
to take if the suit would affect military discipline, but one
or both of the first two rationales are missing. If anything,
Johnson adds to the confusion. While purporting to recognize the continuing viability of all three Feres rationales,
the opinion arguably focused solely on the discipline factor to reach its result.22 °
The case undoubtedly increases the government's exposure to FTCA liability. By the same stroke, it opens up
new avenues of compensation for injured military personnel. At least in the Eleventh Circuit, the government no
longer will be able to rely on boilerplate arguments when
sued by an active-duty serviceman injured at the hands of
a civilian federal employee. The United States will be able
to block such claims only by showing that the rationales
for Feres apply. Johnson probably will not adversely affect
military discipline, despite government contentions to the
contrary, 22 ' since it requires a fresh analysis of the discipline factor each time the Johnson paradigm arises. When
the tortfeasor is a civilian employee of the government,
Johnson refuses to implicate the discipline rationale auto219 See Dombroff, Comntentary on Johnson v. United States, Av. LITIG. REP., Feb. 17,
1986, at 4608, 4609. Dombroff offers the following observation on the Johnson

decision:
It appears that the Supreme Court will once again have the opportunity to consider the liability of the United States. There is little
doubt but that intensive discussions are presently on-going in the
Justice Department regarding the question of taking the Eleventh
Circuit decision in Johnson to the Supreme Court. Obviously, if certi-

orari is not sought or is denied, a profound change will have been
made to the complexion of government litigation. The real excite-

ment, however, will arise if certiorai is granted.
Id. at 4609.
2" See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
2'
Petition for Rehearing, supra note 201, at 12.
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matically as it would in a typical Feres paradigm.2 22 Instead, an examination of the Feres rationales as they apply
to the particular facts must ensue. 223 The Johnson reasoning presumably would still allow application of the Feres
doctrine if FTCA recovery would adversely affect military
discipline under the circumstances.224
Finally,Johnson'soverall impact on the Feres doctrine remains uncertain. Since it concededly involves a fact situation different from the typical Feres case,2 2 5 the
government may argue that Johnson should be dismissed
as inapposite in future Feres analyses. On the other hand,
it may be seen as further erosion of an already much-criticized doctrine.2 26
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its own assertion to the contrary, 227Johnson represents a fresh and novel approach to FTCA claims by
military personnel. Granted, other courts have taken the
position that the Feres rationales must be analyzed when
the facts at hand present a twist not found in the Feres paradigm.228 Johnson, however, stands alone for the proposition that if the serviceman received his injury at the hands
of a civilian government employee, the case does not fall
automatically into the Feres web.
This willingness to break new ground is one of the
more admirable attributes of Johnson. The opinion serves
as a reminder that Congress and the courts have a long
way to go in perfecting a system which provides fair and
adequate compensation to service personnel victimized by
government negligence. It also illustrates the kind of judicial creativity courts have had to employ to avoid the
harsh consequences of Feres. Certainly the case adds its
Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1540.
See id. at 1538.
224 See id. at 1538-40.
22.5 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
"'2 See supra note 55.
227 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537-38.
228 See, e.g., Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670.
222

22.1
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voice to the chorus of Feres criticism, and sounds the
reveille for reanalysis of the law in this area.22 9
For the aforementioned reasons, Johnson represents a
step in the right direction. Nonetheless, the case has
some weaknesses. First, the court ignored its opportunity
to clarify the probative force of each Feres rationale. This
omission leaves a cloak of mystery wrapped around the
Feres rationales. No one knows whether the three rationales are conjunctive requirements, or if one or more can
support Feres independently.
Another weakness in the opinion lies in the court's reluctance to accept the argument that the military discipline factor must be considered each time the Feres
defense arises. The court reached the nonsensical conclusion that the discipline rationale must be analyzed when
the case involves a civilian tortfeasor, but implicates itself
automatically when a serviceman receives injuries incident
to service at the hands of a fellow serviceman. 230 If it is
inappropriate to focus solely on the victim's status in
cases like Johnson,23 t it becomes equally inappropriate to
assume that the rationales are applicable simply because
the tortfeasor occupies a military position. The court offers a poor excuse for not requiring analysis of the applicability of the rationales even in a typical Feres paradigm,
when it suggests that a case-by-case discipline analysis
would force the Armed Services to maintain a claims department. 32 This kind of reasoning leads to application of
a rule without reason - an approach which the Johnson
court emphatically rejected. 33 For example, one has difficulty seeing how a claim for injuries received en route to
229 WhileJohnson does not expressly criticize the Feres rule, a careful reading of
the case leaves the impression that the court agrees with many of the criticisms
leveled at the doctrine. Similarly, the court at least implicitly acknowledges the
need to take a fresh look at Feres.
230 Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537.

2s, Id. at 1539-40.

See id. at 1536 n.6 (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 146).
See id. at 1540. Note that similar blind applications of the sovereign immunity doctrine led to its ultimate downfall. See supra note 10 and the sources cited
therein.
252
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an optional, military-sponsored beach party 23 4 has greater
adverse effects on discipline than the claim in Johnson.23 5
In summary,Johnson offers servicemen greater access to
the federal compensation system. More importantly, it
sheds new light on the problems created by the Feres doctrine, and encourages a deeper probe into the rationales
supporting Feres when new situations arise. Unfortunately, it does not advocate a similar analysis for actions
brought by servicemen qua servicemen. Hopefully, the
Johnson decision will prompt new guidance from the
Supreme Court, and will not be viewed merely as an exception to the exception.
Mark Lloyd Smith

See Degentesh, 230 F. Supp. at 764.

Johnson concluded that the claim in question could not "conceivably impinge
on the military disciplinary structure." Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539 n.l !. However,
given the military's reliance on its close working relationship with the FAA, see
supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text, the court perhaps dismissed the discipline
rationale too quickly and should have given more scrutinous consideration to the
role of air traffic controllers in the disciplinary context. According to one observer, however, the relationship between FAA controllers and Coast Guard pilots
differs little from the relationship between FAA controllers and civilian pilots.
Conversation with Lieutenant Commander Richard Norat, Command Flight
Safety Officer, United States Coast Guard Aviation Training Center, Mobile, Alabama (Feb. 27, 1986). Lieutenant Commander Norat, who knew HortonJohnson
personally, also suggests that the Johnson opinion actually may improve discipline.
Norat bases this suggestion on the fact that many Coast Guard pilots familiar with
the case have greater confidence in a system which acknowledges and deals with
controller negligence instead of trying to conceal or ignore such negligence. Id.

